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Abstract   This article provides a survey of the economic literature on investment be-
haviour and capacity adjustment in fisheries. An overview of the existing theoretical 
and the empirical work is provided, and areas that require more work are pointed out. 
The survey shows that while a large body of theoretical work has been developed on 
the issue of capital adjustment in fisheries, relatively less attention has been granted 
to the theory of investment, where this becomes a separate decision to the decision 
about capital levels; i.e., where capital is quasi-malleable. In addition, empirical 
studies have been fairly limited, and more work is still needed to analyse and further 
investigate these issues in practical situations. There is particularly a need for more 
empirical studies of investment behaviour and drivers of investment behaviour at the 
firm level based on adequate economic data.
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Introduction
Investment can be defined as the change over time in capital stocks. While investment 
appears a key to understanding past changes and possible futures of marine fisheries, 
scholars have recently stressed that it is still poorly understood (Garcia and Grainger 
2005; Munro 2010). this may be partly due to the fact that while the theory of capital 
in the fishery is now well established, research on capital dynamics in this sector has, to 
some extent, proceeded as if capital stocks entailed only variable costs; in other words as 
if capital invested in marine fisheries could be considered perfectly malleable (Burt and 
Cummings 1970; Munro 2010). Under such circumstances, levels of capital and invest-
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ment become essentially equivalent problems. however, as stressed by Munro (2010), 
the more common situation in marine fisheries is for capital to have a degree of non-mal-
leability such that the basic bioeconomic theory of capital in the fishery is inapplicable. 
Where capital is not perfectly malleable, capital levels and the rate at which these change 
become separate but related decisions, lead to a greater degree of complexity and to the 
need for a separate theory of investment. In addition, while the key role of the firm’s 
investment behaviour in the evolution of fisheries is now widely recognised, empirical 
studies of capital changes in ocean fisheries and the micro-economic drivers of these 
changes have only developed recently and still remain relatively scarce.
  Past reviews of the literature on investment in marine fisheries have focused on the 
conceptual framework of capital theory in a sector harvesting a renewable resource (Mun-
ro 1998; Gréboval and Munro 1999; Charles 2007). In this survey, we provide a synthesis 
of the key elements of this conceptual framework and focus on reviewing empirical stud-
ies that have attempted to apply this framework with the objective of providing a basis for 
identifying current perspectives for future research. Our purpose is to give an overview of 
the main areas that have been considered, in terms of both the questions addressed and 
the approaches used. Rather than providing a complete survey of the literature, we use 
selected articles to illustrate what we believe are the main lines of investigation that have 
been explored to date and those that could be pursued further, particularly from an em-
pirical perspective. In particular, our review of the empirical literature shows that further 
research is required on the determinants of investment strategies into the different compo-
nents of capital in fisheries, including physical capital, natural capital, human capital, and 
access rights to fish resources.
  The article is structured as follows. The first section provides a brief summary of the 
theoretical literature on investment in fisheries. The second section considers empirical 
studies of investment and capacity adjustment in capture fisheries. Section three concludes 
by discussing the implications of the survey in terms of current research perspectives.
Theoretical Models of Investment Behaviour
Conceptual studies of capital dynamics in marine fisheries have taken one of two alternative 
stands. Some have centred on the determination of optimal investment paths towards desir-
able levels of capital stocks and have usually been applied to an entire fishery, considering 
that it could be managed by a single owner acting to benefit society. Others have focused on 
the incentives created by economic and regulatory circumstances under which fishing firms 
operate and the resulting investment behaviour leading to changes in capital stocks.
  The approach taken has, to some extent, influenced the categories of capital con-
sidered in these studies. Four distinct types of capital can be encountered in economic 
studies of marine fisheries: natural, physical, human, and immaterial. By definition, 
natural capital in the form of commercial fish stocks cannot be produced by man, but is 
available to fishing firms as a result of the functioning of marine ecosystems. Physical 
capital encompasses equipment and infrastructure that is required for the operation of 
fishing activities, while human capital relates to labour inputs needed to catch and process 
fish (e.g., skilled crews). We use the term immaterial capital to reflect the need for fishing 
firms to own fishing rights in contexts where access to fisheries is regulated. The focus 
of sole-owner type models is on optimal harvesting and optimal capital investment at the 
scale of a fishery, and hence, the influence of such fishing rights on investment patterns 
has usually not been considered in these models. In addition, these models have granted 
relatively little attention to human capital and issues of investment therein. Shifting the 
focus from a sole-owner perspective to a context where multiple firms make investment 
decisions in response to incentives created by the economic and regulatory circumstances 
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This is the case if fishing rights, such as transferable quotas or effort units, are required to 
operate in a fishery. At this scale, however, the firms will usually not have a real option to 
invest in natural capital, since they may be too small to have a noticeable impact on fish 
stock size. Instead, the fishery manager typically decides on investment in natural capital 
through the choice of quotas and other regulations, while fishing firms will take this as 
given and act on levels of physical capital, human capital, and immaterial fishing rights.
  Below, we discuss the existing theoretical work on investment in fisheries. We 
start out by reviewing studies that have considered the existence of a sole owner. Later, 
we turn to studies of investment behaviour that include an evaluation of the impacts of 
regulations on firm-level decisions; in particular, where these regulations pertain to the 
definition of access rights.
Models of Optimal Investment Paths
The seminal work on investment theory in fisheries was developed in the late 1960s by 
Smith (1968) and during the 1970s by Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979). Clark, Clarke, 
and Munro (1979) combined the previous work of Clark and Munro on the use of capital 
theory to analyse investment in natural capital with theories of investment in physical 
capital, particularly focusing on the irreversibility of fishing capital (Clark and Munro 
1975; Clark 1976). In this section, we start out by providing a brief introduction to the 
model of Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979) before presenting some of the subsequent 
theoretical work on physical investment in fisheries.
  The model of Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979) is based on a standard bioeconomic 
model of a single species fishery operated by a sole owner seeking to maximise the net 
present value of the fishery. The dynamics of the fish stock are given by:
  ( ) () () () X F X t qE t X t = −  ,  (1)
where F(X) is the natural growth function of the stock, which depends on the stock size 
X, and qEX represents the harvest rate h(t). h(t)=q0E(t)X(t) is known as the Schaefer pro-
duction function, with q0 representing a (constant) catchability coefficient and where E(t) 
is total fishing effort at time t.
  Physical capital is introduced to the Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979) model as a 
limit on the effort available at time t. This constrains fishing effort to E(t)∈[0,K(t)], where 
K(t) is the capital stock at time t. Capital dynamics follow the investment model presented 
above; i.e., with    () () . K It t Kt G      
  the objective function of the sole owner can then be stated as follows:
                ^ `
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where ρ is the discount rate, p is the output price, w is the operating cost per unit effort, 
and      It I    is the price of capital. this function is maximised over the control variables 
E(t) and I(t), subject to dynamic constraints on physical capital and fish stock dynamics. 
  Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979) analyse three different cases, varying only in 
the assumed degree of malleability of physical capital. When physical capital is per-
fectly malleable, there is no constraint on investment:  ( ) [ ] , It∈ −∞ ∞ . In addition, it is 
assumed that the purchase price and the disposal price of capital are identical:    . I c I      Nøstbakken, Thébaud, and Sørensen 98
In this case, the stock variable, K, can be eliminated from the model, and the problem 
reduces to the problem dealt with in Clark and Munro (1975). With perfectly malleable 
capital, the capital level can be increased and decreased at a constant capital cost, and 
the problem becomes linear both in investment and effort. In this case, the optimal solu-
tion is the so-called “bang-bang approach” to the optimal biomass level. the other cases 
considered are perfectly non-malleable capital ( ( ) 0 It≥  and zero depreciation δ = 0), 
quasi-malleable capital ( ( ) 0 It≥  and depreciation δ > 0), and a situation where there is a 
market for second-hand physical capital (    , I I I I
  !    where  0 I
+ >  and  0 I
− < ). A key 
result obtained is that if fishing capital is quasi-malleable, the optimal restoration of an 
overexploited fish stock is a gradual approach to the optimal long-run biomass level. The 
optimal adjustment of fleet capacity will be gradual, rather than the most rapid approach 
that results under the assumption of perfect malleability.
  Hence, while the main conclusion of Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979) is that the 
optimal long-run equilibrium is unaffected by the degree of malleability of capital, their 
analysis shows that short-run optimal policies are significantly affected by this. In par-
ticular, the authors find that the less malleable physical capital is, the more it becomes 
necessary for a fish stock to be severely depleted before “extreme policies of stock reha-
bilitation” (e.g., fishing moratoria) can be optimal. Furthermore, the authors conclude that 
while excessive capitalization may develop in fisheries due to the common-pool status of 
fish resources, quasi-malleability of physical capital may also justify a degree of over-
capitalization in a fishery.
  Boyce (1995) extends the work of Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979) by allowing 
both the investment cost function    I I    and the net harvesting revenues (harvesting rev-
enues minus harvesting costs) to be non-linear. Under these assumptions, the bang-bang 
approach is no longer optimal. Instead, a gradual approach to optimal capital levels is 
desirable. the model is further extended by Sandal, Steinshamn, and hoff (2007), who 
introduce fixed costs of capital; that is, there is a cost of keeping capital whether it is uti-
lised or not. the authors also replace the non-negative constraint on investment from the 
non-malleable capital assumption with a convex investment cost function (or revenue if 
disinvesting). With these model modifications, their objective function depends both on 
the resource and capital stocks. The convex investment cost and fixed capital cost lead to 
more conservative resource utilisation. In addition, the approach paths toward the optimal 
steady state changes and over- or undershooting may occur; that is, increase (decrease) in 
a state variable may occur even if the current state is above (below) the steady state level. 
this occurs as a result of the convexity of investment costs and the downward sloping 
demand function. A rapid reduction of the fish stock is suboptimal because high harvest 
levels yield a lower output price, while the convexity of the investment cost function 
makes fast reduction of capital levels suboptimal (undershooting).
  Other related work includes Kennedy (1989), who analyses capacity and optimal har-
vesting policies in a multi-cohort model with initial excess capacity. the author considers 
adjustment paths to optimal steady state harvests that involve zero investment in the ini-
tial time periods while existing physical capital is being depreciated, followed by periods 
of investment to replace depreciating initial capacity when such investment becomes eco-
nomically warranted. Botsford and Wainwright (1985) also explored the implications for 
optimal investment policies of biological models that include size structure and explicit 
density-dependence processes, when it is assumed that there are fixed costs of physical 
capital. their analysis shows that when these costs are high enough, the optimal policy 
may be a constant policy. 
  The issue of capital market imperfections has received much attention in the gen-
eral economic literature on physical investment. this issue is also highly relevant to 
investment in fisheries. Jørgensen and Kort (1997) analyse capital investment policies 
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a sole-owner fishery and model the firm’s harvesting, capital investment, and financing 
decisions. This represents an extension of Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979) since the 
interest rate on debt is now increasing in cumulative debt. Jørgensen and Kort find that 
a small firm in terms of equity that starts out with a small fish stock does not harvest 
until the fish stock reaches a threshold level. In the meantime, the firm should dispose of 
its fishing capital and invest in financial assets. When the resource stock becomes suf-
ficiently large, all financial assets are sold and the proceeds are invested in fishing capital 
along with additional borrowed funds. When the optimal steady state is reached, the firm 
maintains the stock at a constant level.
  Another strand of the literature focuses on the introduction of uncertainty to the 
fisheries investment model, as fluctuations in stock size and catch quotas also affect the 
optimal level of fishing capacity. This is addressed by Hannesson (1987) who shows how 
deterministic models may give inadequate guidelines for optimal capacity and fishing ef-
fort. The author stresses the importance of explicitly taking into account environmental 
variability in fishery models. This can be done by adding a stochastic term to the growth 
function in the stock dynamics equation (1), which results in the following:
  ( ) () () () () X F X t z t qE t X t =−  ,  (3)
where z is a stochastic variable with mean one. In expected terms, stock dynamics are 
identical to those of the deterministic model presented above. however, the variation 
around the expected value can have implications for optimal investment paths. For details 
on this, see work by Charles (1983, 1985) and Hannesson (1993).
  A recent study of investment under stock growth uncertainty is Singh, Weninger, 
and Doyle (2006). The authors develop a discrete-time model of a fishery with stochastic 
stock growth and costly capital adjustment. A stochastic variable is added multiplicative-
ly, similar to what was shown in equation (3). the purchase and resale prices of capital 
differ, with c+ > c–. They find that capital investment is only undertaken in periods when 
stock growth is particularly good, whereas disinvestment is only optimal in periods with 
particularly bad stock growth. Furthermore, the authors find that costly investment revers-
ibility entails incentives towards the smoothing of harvest over time. this, in turn, may 
lead to increased variability in stock size.
Models of Investment behaviour
thus far, we have focused on studies that analyse optimal investment paths under the 
assumption of a sole owner. A second set of studies has placed greater emphasis on the 
understanding of the drivers of micro-economic investment behaviour and how these af-
fect capital dynamics at the scale of a fishery. These studies usually grant specific attention 
to the regulatory context in which a fishing firm operates, since this affects the firm’s profit 
maximization problem and its investment decisions and capital level. The studies often 
also consider how modifying this may affect the incentives faced by firms in a fishery.
  Early economic models of marine fisheries typically assumed an open-access system 
where changes in the number of vessels followed the profitability of the fishery (Gordon 
1954; Scott 1955). dynamic models of entry and exit were then developed that directly 
link the entry and exit of vessels in a given fishery to the economic incentives associated 
with such choices (e.g., Smith 1968, 1969; Mackinson, Sumaila, and Pitcher 1997; Pascoe 
and Revill 2004). Smith (1968, 1969) introduced explicit representation of capital invest-
ment in his model of a fishery, focusing on the open-access regime, and he showed how 
entry and exit depend on current economic incentives in the fishery, defined in terms of 
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opportunity costs. Mackinson, Sumaila, and Pitcher (1997) analysed the implications of 
different catchability models on harvesting and stock collapse under the assumption that 
investment and disinvestment depend on current profits. Eisenack, Welsch, and Kropp 
(2006) provide an analysis of physical and natural capital dynamics in an open-access 
fishery with non-linear investment costs and stock-dependent harvesting costs. They use 
qualitative simulation and find that the development of excess capacities is unavoidable 
in such a model. In a developing fishery, the physical capital stock continues to grow for 
a period even after the harvest has started to decline due to the reduction in fish biomass. 
They find that this overcapitalisation period occurs as a result of the partial substitutabil-
ity between physical and natural capital in the production process which they assume. 
  Later work focused on the fact that exit of vessels from a fishery can be difficult, as 
there may be few alternative opportunities (Ikiara and Odink 1999). Sumaila (1995) mod-
els investment and harvesting in a non-cooperative, two-player fishery game under the 
assumption of irreversible investment. He analyses a fish stock harvested by two fleets. 
In the first stage, the fleets determine their capacity level (investment), and in the second 
stage, they determine harvest levels. Sumaila (1995) characterises the nash equilibrium 
and the sole-owner outcome. Not surprisingly, non-cooperation drives the stock far below 
the collectively optimal levels that would occur under a cooperative solution.
  McKelvey (1985) extends the model by Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979) to allow 
for convexities in costs, prices, and the production function. the author uses his model 
to analyse open access and the sole-owner case under the assumption of irreversible 
investment. He assumes individual firms consider expected future returns when mak-
ing investment decisions. the open-access outcome deviates from the socially optimal 
solution because of the well-known stock externality. This leads to excessive capital 
investment and excessive harvest early on. It later leads to depleted stock levels, low har-
vest, and no net return to investment. Mckelvey then examines the potential for taxes on 
harvests and investment to guide such a fishery along a dynamically optimal path.
  Departing from the assumption that fisheries resources are under open access con-
ditions, another branch of research has focused on the implications of various fisheries 
management instruments where adequate access restrictions are only partially established 
and/or effective. Homans and Wilen (1997) consider the case where the dynamics of 
a fishery is driven by rent dissipation under what they term “regulated open access,” 
with regulations focused on the conservation of fish stocks changing in response to the 
adjustment of fishing fleets to the economic status of the fishery. Another management 
instrument that has received attention in fisheries is buyback programs. Buyback programs 
are directly aimed at reducing fishing capacity. The effects of buyback programs on invest-
ment behaviour were analysed by Weninger and McConnell (2000). The authors develop a 
Cournot model of investment and characterise investment equilibria for vessels operating 
in a total allowable catch (TAC) regulated fishery before and after the introduction of a 
buyback scheme. They conclude that while buyback programs reduce capacity in the short-
run, the fishermen remaining in the fishery have strengthened incentives to invest after the 
buyback, and the long-run capacity effects are therefore limited. These perverse impacts of 
buyback programs are also discussed by Holland, Gudmundsson, and Gates (1999).
  In addition, Clark, Munro, and Sumaila (2005, 2007) show that buyback schemes can 
create a time consistency problem if vessel owners anticipate the schemes. the authors 
analyse this time consistency problem in a theoretical model based on Clark, Clarke, 
and Munro (1979). They find that under rational expectations regarding the policy of the 
fishery manager, the anticipated buybacks have the same effect as an immediate subsidy 
to vessel owners. The time consistency problem persists even if buybacks are combined 
with the introduction of access regulations in the form of an individual transferable quota 
(ItQ) system. 
  The impacts of introducing access regulations in fisheries have also attracted growing 
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argues that fisheries managed by limited entry often experience increased use of capital by 
each firm, which counteracts the intention of limiting fishing effort. Townsend identifies 
six different incentives that cause increased use of capital in access regulated fisheries, but 
notes that not all incentives are economically undesirable. hence, the net effect of intro-
ducing access regulations is uncertain. The incentives he identifies are: i) the output effect 
arising when limited entry increases marginal revenue per unit of effort, which, in turn, 
gives the individual firm incentives to increase output; ii) the substitution effect arising 
when firms increase the use of unrestricted inputs while limiting the use of restricted in-
puts; iii) the cost of capital goes down because of increased stability and higher revenues; 
iv) the incentives to innovate increase since fewer vessels share the gains; v) the cross-sub-
stitution effect arising if firms no longer regard the marginal cost of the fish stock as zero, 
as may be the case under open access; vi) the consumption effect that arises if capital en-
ters the individual utility function of fishermen. While the first two effects lead to reduced 
efficiency in production, the opposite is the case for the four remaining incentives.
  Of particular interest to this review are the studies which focus on the influence of 
fishing rights on investment patterns in a fishery, particularly in the form of ITQs (Arnason 
1990; boyce 1992; Copes 1986; Grafton 1996). this management instrument has received 
widespread attention among economists, as the theoretical work on the implications of 
introducing ITQs suggests greater efficiency than with the command and control manage-
ment approaches currently used in many fisheries. With command and control, efficiency 
is typically defined in terms of total economic value realised in the fishery over time.
  In practice, where individual harvesting rights exist and are tradable between firms 
(ItQs), the harvesting rights can be considered a distinct type of capital in which invest-
ment is required for a firm to operate. Weninger and Just (2002) study entry and exit in 
a natural resource industry in which firms must invest in an output permit to enter the 
industry. Thus, in order to produce, firms must invest both in physical capital and output 
permits. the effects of uncertainty in the permit price, particularly in terms of entry and 
exit behaviour, are explored. Although not specifically focused on the fishing industry, 
their analysis also offers useful insights for fisheries. Hannesson (1996) investigates the 
long-run equilibrium levels of physical capital, quota holdings, and quota price in an ItQ 
regulated fishery with stochastic stock growth. The author finds that higher output price 
or lower interest rate causes the long-run equilibrium quota price to increase, which, in 
turn, may reduce each firm’s optimal number of quota shares to hold.
  In a later study, hannesson (2000) analyses optimal investment under an ItQ sys-
tem when the share system of remuneration is used. He finds that the share system can 
result in under or over investment under ItQs, depending on the catch share of the vessel 
owner. the incentive to invest is distorted for the vessel owner because the gain from ob-
taining an additional quota must be shared with the crew. Vessel owners would, therefore, 
be willing to pay less for quotas, which makes the alternative of investing in a new boat 
relatively more attractive.
  Novak, Kaitala, and Feichtinger (1995) consider a case where a firm leases out the 
right to manage a fish resource from the government that entails payment of a resource fee 
reflecting the social value of the resource including both use and non-use values. Assuming 
perfectly malleable capital and increasing marginal costs of investment, the authors show 
that optimal investment policy for the firm is not necessarily towards a constant steady-
state level, but rather periodic capital investments, which cause cycles in the fish stock. 
This is because the leasing firm must deal with two contradicting objectives of maximizing 
profits derived from extraction of the fish resource while seeking to maintain its biomass.
  While these are potentially important implications of rights-based fisheries manage-
ment for the capital dynamics of marine fisheries, it appears that few theoretical studies to 
date have explicitly analysed investment in the different components of capital in fisher-
ies, including immaterial capital in the form of fishing rights.
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Empirical Research
Despite this substantial body of theoretical work, there are currently few empirical stud-
ies that primarily investigate investment in fisheries and the firm-level investment drivers 
in fisheries. A possible explanation is limited data availability on investment and capital 
in marine fisheries (Kirkley and Squires 1988). To estimate the theoretical models of 
firm-level investment presented in the review of theoretical studies, data on a range of 
economic variables by firm and over time are required. In particular, empirical studies 
in this domain depend on reliable estimates of capital stocks and their development; i.e., 
investments. Another possible explanation is the ongoing discussions on measurement of 
capacity (Kirkley, Morrison Paul, and Squires 2002). There are, however, some studies 
primarily focused on investment and relevant studies on related topics. Most focus on the 
behaviour of fishing operators and can be directly related to the second group of theo-
retical studies reviewed in the previous section. In the following, key results from these 
studies are summarised and commented upon. We first consider studies of entry-exit, 
which assume fishing operators can freely adjust their levels of capital and harvesting ef-
fort under open-access conditions. We then consider analyses of the effects of government 
interventions on capital dynamics in fisheries, including subsidies, buyback schemes, and 
access regulations. Finally, we examine research developments that have sought to iden-
tify the behavioural drivers of investment strategies at the level of individual fishers or 
fishing firms.
Empirical Models of Entry-exit in Marine Fisheries
Attempts at developing empirical models for entry-exit in particular fisheries have been 
limited. Early work in this area centred on the estimation of parameters measuring the 
speed at which fleets respond to changes in the average profitability of fisheries in terms 
of vessel entries and exits (Wilen 1976; Bjørndal and Conrad 1987). Wilen (1976) stud-
ied the dynamics of the North Pacific fur seal fishery from 1882 to 1899. He developed 
a model that describes the cycles of an open-access fishery in terms of stock dynamics, 
harvesting, and profits in order to assess the likelihood of extinction if the fishery had re-
mained open-access.
  Following a similar approach, bjørndal and Conrad (1987) conduct an empirical 
analysis of capital dynamics in the Norwegian North Sea herring fishery. They use data 
on purse seine vessels between 1963 and 1977 and measure effort in terms of standard-
ized purse seine units. They assume that fleet adjustments are proportional to profits in 
the fishery. Bjørndal and Conrad (1987) allow for new vessels being built adding to the 
total number of boats when profits in the fishery are positive. Due to the time required 
to build new vessels, lagged values of average profits per boat are included as explana-
tory variables when estimating the fleet dynamics function. They find that the appropriate 
number of lags is two years, reflecting the time required to build a new purse seine vessel. 
Furthermore, Bjørndal and Conrad include the relative price of mackerel as an indicator 
of alternative fishing options and conclude that fleet adjustments depend on profits and 
returns in alternative fisheries.
  Another study of entry-exit and investment drivers in marine fisheries is the Clark 
and Lamberson (1982) study of the pelagic whaling industry in Antarctica. this industry 
followed a boom and bust trajectory from 1925–1965, a development initiated by remark-
ably high profits during the early 1920s (Clark and Lamberson 1982). From 1946, a quota 
system was adopted by the International Whaling Commission, but since quotas were 
not allocated to countries or individuals, a race for catch was initiated and investments in 
capacity rose dramatically. Although excess capacity in the whaling fleet was largely due 
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could also have occurred under a harvesting strategy driven by profit maximization. The 
economic interest of resource users in stock preservation would have been limited and de-
pletion optimal from their point of view, given that the return on alternative investments 
surpassed annual sustainable yields from whaling. this emphasises the importance of the 
opportunity cost of capital when analysing investment and capacity adjustment strategies.
  Kronbak (2005) investigates the dynamics of the Baltic Sea cod fishery, which is 
shared between the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea (Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Russian Federation). She calibrates 
the empirical model based on data of typical Danish vessels operating in the fishery, us-
ing data up until 1999 to estimate the biological part of the model. Similar to bjørndal 
and Conrad (1987), the dynamics of fishing effort follow normalised profit, defined as a 
period’s profit divided by output price times effort. Kronbak uses the model to study open 
access dynamics, including the stability of steady state. the results show that open access 
may lead to stock depletion. Nøstbakken (2008) carries out a similar analysis of the North 
Sea herring fishery between 1981 and 2001, but takes into account uncertainty in stock 
growth and focuses on optimal management.
  Pascoe and Revill (2004) analyse entry and exit in the European brown shrimp fish-
ery. The fishery is characterised by mobile effort that can easily be moved into and out of 
the fishery. The authors develop and calibrate a bioeconomic model using country level 
data to investigate the effects of an introduction of selective trawls to reduce bycatches. 
the gear restriction was legislated by the European Union and implemented in 2003. 
Pascoe and Revill start out by estimating the opportunity cost of operating in the fishery 
by country as the shadow price of each country’s effort constraint, which is given by the 
observed effort level in 1997. next, they relax the effort constraints and modify the catch-
ability coefficients to account for the introduced gear restrictions. They assume that effort 
is only allocated to the fishery if the returns from fishing exceed the opportunity cost. The 
results show that the gear restriction increases efficiency, since it corrects the bycatch 
externality. However, the benefits are not equally shared between the different countries; 
some will gain while others will lose. 
  The first studies, presented above, measured capital as the number of boats that were 
assumed to be identical. This is a weakness, since both capital value and opportunity 
costs are likely to vary considerably between vessels and over time. This is confirmed 
by the study of Pascoe and Revill (2004), which looks at differences in opportunity costs 
across countries. More recent empirical studies have used a discrete choice modelling 
framework; particularly random utility modelling (RUM) to analyse behaviour at the 
individual fishing firm level, taking heterogeneity into account. In random utility mod-
els, agents make choices between different discrete alternatives based on what yields the 
highest utility. Agents’ utility typically consists of a systematic component that is com-
mon to all agents and a random component that varies across agents. While these studies 
do not analyse investment per se, they seek to predict how existing and new vessels move 
into, out of, or between fisheries.
  This work was initiated by Bockstael and Opaluch (1983, 1984), who investigate 
the transfer of vessels from one fishery to another. The authors consider three distinct 
decisions that fishermen can make: fishermen currently in a fishery can change their level 
of fishing activity, fishermen can switch between fisheries, and effort can change due to 
entry or exit from fishing. Bockstael and Opaluch argue that each of these decisions must 
be treated separately, since they are likely to depend on different factors. They develop 
a model of fishery alternative choices and apply this to the New England fisheries. They 
find that although fishermen respond to economic incentives, a large change in returns is 
required for fishermen to switch fisheries. 
  Ward and Sutinen (1994) develop a model of entry and exit, which they incorporate 
into a dynamic bioeconomic model of the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery. They model 
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discrete alternatives. Fishing firms can enter the fishery from an alternative fishery, con-
struct a new vessel and enter from outside the fishing industry, remain in the fishery, exit 
the fishery to enter another fishery, or retire from the fishing industry. Ward and Sutinen 
used a multinomial logit specification that they estimated based on a random sample of 
about 300 vessels from 1965 to 1975 and 1981 to 1983. their results support that changes 
in effort are proportional to profits, as suggested by the theoretical work presented earlier. 
Furthermore, the results show that firms are more likely to enter the fishery when profits 
increase than they are to leave the fishery when profits decline. This is in line with the 
theoretical results for non-malleability or quasi-malleable capital discussed earlier (Clark, 
Clarke, and Munro 1979). In a similar study of Hawaiian long-liners, Pradhan and Leung 
(2004) used revenue by gross tonnage in a multinomial logit framework to consider exit 
and entry strategies versus staying in the fishery.
  table 1 summarises the estimation of entry and exit in the studies of individual 
fisheries surveyed above. Notice that only Ward and Sutinen (1994) make use of both 
cross-sectional and time-series data. All other studies use either cross-sectional data or 
time-series data. Recall that theoretical work on entry-exit predicts that entry and exit 
depend on profits in the industry. Of the studies listed in table 1, only Pradhan and Leung 
(2004) do not include a measure of profits in the estimated equation. Other explanatory 
variables used in the models include input and output prices (bjørndal and Conrad 1987; 
Ward and Sutinen 1994), fish stock sizes (Bjørndal and Conrad 1987; Pradhan and Leung 
2004; Ward and Sutinen 1994), and vessel and fleet characteristics (Pradhan and Leung 
2004; Ward and Sutinen 1994). Bockstael and Opaluch (1983, 1984) use expected returns 
and the variability of returns as explanatory variables.
Table 1
Estimation of Investment Relationships: Selected Entry-exit Models
Study          Aggregation   Observations      Estimator       dependent Variable
bjørndal and Conrad (1987)  Fleet  15 years  OLS  no. of vessels
Wilen (1976)  Fleet  18 years  OLS  No. of vessels
Bockstael and Opaluch (1983)  Vessel  657 vessels  Logit  Fishery alternatives  
          (location and gear)
Bockstael and Opaluch (1984)  Vessel  657 vessels  Logit  Fishery alternatives  
          (location and gear)
Pradhan and Leung (2004)  Vessel  347 vessels  Logit  Fishery entry, stay, exit  
          choices
Ward and Sutinen (1994)  Vessel  300 vessels,   Logit  Fishery entry, stay, exit,  
      14 years    retire choices
Government Interventions and Investment in Fisheries
With an increase in the number of regulations that have been applied to marine fisheries, 
the cases where fisheries remain under free and open access have become increasingly 
rare. hence, studies of investment behaviour have progressively extended to include the 
influence of regulations and the incentives they create. Here, we review a selection of re-
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Subsidies and Buyback Programs
A recent OECD report deals with the implications of financial support to fisheries (OECD 
2006). Among the different types of financial support considered are vessel decommis-
sioning and licence retirement schemes and investment and modernisation subsidies. 
These issues directly affect fishery investment decisions. Other types of subsidies dis-
cussed in the report are relevant, as they may impact investment behaviour in fisheries 
indirectly (see also the report by Milazzo (1998) on fisheries subsidies). 
  With the need to reduce fishing capacity in overcapitalized fisheries, an increasing 
number of regulatory schemes offer payments to vessel owners to decommission their 
fishing unit as part of programmes designed to rationalise fishing fleets. The nature and 
impacts of these schemes are the focus of a recent book edited by Curtis and Squires 
(2007). Buyback programs are typically aimed at buying fishing licences and/or fishing 
vessels in order to reduce the fishing capacity of the fleet. The existence of such programs 
is assumed to affect the decision to exit, as it alleviates the capital non-malleability prob-
lem. however, as indicated in the previous section, it may also affect the decision to enter, 
as the existence of decommissioning programs and the anticipation of such programs in 
the future reduces the cost of capital by ensuring a higher minimum scrap value upon exit 
(Clark, Munro, and Sumaila 2005).
  Guyader, daurès, and Fifas (2004) develop and calibrate a bioeconomic simulation 
model of a French coastal fishery: the Saint Brieuc scallop fishery. The model is used to 
carry out a cost-benefit analysis of a decommissioning scheme. Their results show that 
the decommissioning scheme can reduce the number of vessels, but increased technical 
efficiency for vessels that remain in the fishery will counteract this. The authors argue that 
an allocation of fishing rights must be done with decommissioning schemes to avoid an 
increase in fishing effort from remaining vessels. This is in line with the theoretical work 
on buybacks presented above.
  Mardle et al. (2006) compare models of entry, stay, and exit of vessels in three Eu-
ropean fisheries using multinomial (unordered) logit models. The case studies considered 
are the Basque trawl fleet operating in the Bay of Biscay, a French trawler fleet of South-
ern Brittany, and the English beam trawl fleet operating in the North Sea. Results show 
that participation of vessels in a fishery are influenced by the age of vessels, expected 
revenues, and anticipated status of the fish stocks, and also by the decommissioning pre-
miums that were paid by governments to buyback fishing capacity under the European 
buyback schemes.
  The role of the US federal government in fishery investment decisions was examined 
by a task force that submitted their final report in 1999 (Report to Congress 1999). The 
study was a result of the Sustainable Fisheries Act enacted by Congress in 1996. The task 
force made efforts to identify and classify different types of subsidies potentially leading 
to increased investments. The following main categories were defined and analysed in 
the report: direct government payments, implicit payments or charges, price support pro-
grams, general programs that affect fisheries, and tax policies. Kirkley and Squires (1988) 
developed procedures for estimating capital stock and net investment using limited in-
formation on vessels, such as tonnage, length, and engine horsepower using the hedonic 
approach to estimate physical capital stock, which can then be used to estimate net in-
vestment. The authors show that investment in the New England commercial fishing fleet 
increased over their period of study (1965–1981), particularly following the adoption of 
the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976. According to the au-
thors, this could be linked to the adoption of the Act itself, or to the positive expectations 
regarding resource or economic conditions.
  The effects of tax and depreciation legislation on investments in fisheries are ad-
dressed by Jensen (1998). the purpose of his study was to empirically analyse the 
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siderations. the analysis was carried out through econometric estimation of investment 
behaviour based on aggregate data of the Danish fleet over the period 1960–1987. The 
use of aggregated data is in contrast to most empirical studies of investments in fisheries 
that typically employ data on individual units (vessels).
  Jensen (1998) used the insurance value of the vessels to measure investment. due 
to high tax rates and the possibility of vessel depreciation during construction, strong 
incentives for rapid investment in Danish fisheries were expected in years with relatively 
high profits, since firms could reduce their tax payments by ordering a new vessel. Jensen 
made the assumption that fishermen maximise profits and are price takers in input and 
output markets. According to theory, the desired level of capital depends on the produc-
tion level (catches) and the user cost of capital. An increase in catches has a positive 
effect on capital stock, whereas the relationship between the user cost of capital and the 
desired capital level is negative.
  Jensen finds that profits and user cost of capital, tax, and depreciation policies are 
statistically significant variables when explaining investment. This supports the theory 
of firms carefully considering tax levels and depreciation in their investments decisions. 
Long-term changes in the quantity of landings, on the contrary, have no significant effect 
on investment. Jensen concludes that the firms’ investment behaviour appears economi-
cally rational, which suggests the possibility of taxing use of capital in order to influence 
investments. the results support observations of how relatively high tax rates and the 
opportunity of taxing depreciation in advance provide incentives to invest on the basis 
of tax system considerations rather than long-run profitability in the fishery, which is a 
dimension not explicitly captured in most of the theoretical studies reviewed in the previ-
ous section (Jensen 1998).
   Le Floc’h et al. (2011) examine the influence of fiscal regulations on investment in 
French fishing fleets operating along the Atlantic coast. Using an unbalanced panel data 
set containing information on the investment decisions of a sample of fishing firms over 
the period 1994–2004, the authors assess key drivers that may have led these firms to in-
vest or disinvest, including both economic variables and other factors, such as the career 
phases of skipper-owners. A key result of their analysis is that investment strategies were 
driven partially by the fiscal regime related to the profits of these firms and to the sale of 
vessels when fishers retired. The regime actually encouraged vessel owners to invest late 
in their career to reduce their levels of net profits, and hence, pay less tax when they sold 
their vessels upon retiring. 
Access Regulations
Currently, most commercial fisheries are managed under some form of restricted access 
to fish resources. As discussed in the previous section, such restrictions are expected to 
affect the incentives to invest in capital in such fisheries (Townsend 1985). In addition, 
they may lead to the need to consider a category of capital, which we have referred to as 
immaterial capital and is required for the prosecution of a fishery (access rights). Here, 
we review some of the key lines of enquiry that have been pursued in the limited number 
of empirical studies of capital dynamics in access regulated fisheries.
  The main implications of introducing fishing rights are the introduction of a cost of 
investment in fishing rights and a reduction in the race for fish. This creates incentives for 
less efficient firms to disinvest in fisheries where there is excess capacity, and all the more 
when alternative income possibilities exist.
  Squires, Alauddin, and Kirkley (1994) conduct an ex ante analysis of the introduc-
tion of an ITQ program in the Californian sablefish fishery. A linear programming model 
is used in which quota and trade in quota affect the implicit marginal valuation of a firm’s 
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measures are presented as indicators of the incentives to invest or disinvest, although 
actual investment policies can differ. Using CU measures, however, suggests a possible 
concentration of quotas with some vessel owners or processors, but disinvestment may 
not take place instantly. Reasons for the delayed disinvestment include limited alternative 
use for the vessels, differences between discount rates experienced by the vessel owner 
and market discount rates, transaction and information costs, and initial quota distribution 
(Squires, Alauddin, and Kirkley 1994).
  Campbell, brown, and battaglene (1999) studied the impacts of the introduction of 
ITQs in the Australian Southern bluefin tuna fishery. They do not estimate a model, but base 
their analysis on comparisons of summary statistics of vessels. They find that when ITQs 
were introduced, fleet adjustment occurred rapidly, and investments were directed to maxi-
mise the net value of the fishery. After the introduction of ITQs, considerable disinvestments 
in the Southern bluefin tuna fishery took place, which were made possible by easily acces-
sible alternative fishing opportunities. Vessels that left the fishery upon the introduction of 
ITQs were typically also active in other fisheries. Since other fishing alternatives existed for 
these vessels, barriers to exit for this particular fishery were relatively small. 
  Brandt (2007) studied fleet restructuring following the introduction of ITQs in the US 
mid-Atlantic surf-clam fishery. She used data on vessels harvesting surf clams over the 
period 1983–1999 and estimates a model that distinguishes between improved efficiency 
from industry structure and improved vessel efficiency. Brandt uses information on ves-
sel size and vertical integration with processing sector and horizontal integration across 
vessels and estimates efficiency gains of introducing ITQ for each of these vessel seg-
ments using a stochastic production frontier approach. brandt observes that prior to the 
introduction of tradable property rights in the fishery, a number of vessels that had exited 
the fishery re-entered to establish claims to the initial quota allocation. These inefficient 
vessels made efficiency artificially low in the years prior to the introduction of ITQs, and 
since they exited the fishery once the quotas were allocated, they made the efficiency gain 
from ITQs look larger than it actually was. Brandt is able to correct for this distortion and 
concludes that efficiency gains for smaller vessels exceeded those of larger vessels, while 
vertically integrated firms gained more than other firms. She found no statistical differ-
ence in efficiency gains between independent and horizontally integrated firms.
  Securing fishing rights may also entail new investment in fisheries. Eythórsson 
(1996) looked at the economic and social effects of introducing ITQ management in 
Iceland, including the effects on investments. He finds that the introduction of an ITQ 
system in Iceland represented a boost of new capital into the fishery encouraging invest-
ment in fleets. This was mainly due to the possibility of using quotas as security for bank 
loans, often for investments in modern freezer trawlers or fisheries enterprises outside 
of Iceland. This finding can be related to the non-malleability issue dealt with by Clark, 
Clarke, and Munro (1979) discussed in the previous section. With physical capital not 
being perfectly malleable, such assets are not as valuable securities for bank loans as trad-
able production quotas. 
  In a recent study, Nøstbakken (2011) analyses firm-level investment behaviour in the 
Norwegian purse seine fishery, which is managed by transferrable quotas. The analysis 
distinguishes between investment in physical capital and quota capital, in line with the 
theoretical work of Hannesson (1996) and Weninger and Just (2002). Nøstbakken de-
velops a theoretical model of firm-level investment in quota and production capital and 
estimates a reduced form of the model using data on Norwegian purse seine firms from 
2001–2005. the main result is that while the basic economic investment model explains 
investment behaviour within firms over time well, it does not explain differences in 
investment between firms. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that the most economi-
cally efficient firms invest, while less efficient firms disinvest in an ITQ fishery. Thus, the 
efficiency gain from introducing tradable quotas predicted by theory may not occur, at 
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empirical model in an attempt to better explain differences in investment behaviour be-
tween firms. Her analysis shows that investment depends on how much the firms initially 
paid for their quotas. This suggests that firms do not necessarily take into account the full 
opportunity cost of quotas when making decisions if they obtain quotas at prices below 
market value. In addition, the geographical location of the firm, the number of owners, 
and whether the firm is family operated affects firm-level investment behaviour.
  When access to fisheries is limited by regulation, access rights become valuable and 
represent a new form of capital for investment purposes. Flaaten, heen, and Salvanes 
(1995) analyse capitalisation of resource rent in a limited-access fishery. Their hypothesis 
is that the profitability of a vessel that obtained its license for free is higher than that of a 
vessel with a purchased license. to assess this hypothesis, tests of differences in the prof-
itability between the two groups of vessels are conducted. Flaaten, heen, and Salvanes 
conclude that the difference between groups in gross profit margin (defined as income 
from fishing minus share to crew and operating profits) is not significant. Both deprecia-
tion and interest payments are, however, found to be significantly higher for vessels with 
a purchased license, implying a higher user cost of capital. Finally, a test for differences 
in net return on investment reveals significant differences between the two groups of 
vessels. Hence, the main hypothesis is not rejected; there is a significant difference in 
profitability of the two vessel groups. This emphasises the importance of distinguishing 
between investment in physical capital (vessels and gear) and in immaterial capital relat-
ing to fishing access rights (transferable licenses or quotas).
  Guyader et al. (2003) apply the hedonic modelling approach proposed by Kirkley 
and Squires (1988) to the estimation of intangible assets in French fleets operating in the 
northeast Atlantic. the authors test the hypothesis that the price of vessels traded on the 
second-hand market can be separated into two components: a tangible value explained by 
technical characteristics and age of the fishing units, and an intangible value representing 
the price of access rights to the fisheries. These harvesting rights may, to some extent, 
capitalise the value of the rent or quasi-rent flows derived from fishing.1 the results con-
firm the assumption that vessel prices do not only reflect the value of tangible capital, but 
also include the price of intangible capital. While vessel size and age significantly influ-
ence vessel prices, operation permits and licenses account for a large proportion of vessel 
prices on the second-hand market. The authors find that this share increases with vessel 
age and depreciation of tangible capital due to wear and tear.
  A related study is daurès et al. (2006) who measured the value of net capital stock for 
the French fishing fleets using the hedonic approach. Based on a time series of acquisition 
prices of new vessels, regression models were tested to measure gross capital stock at a 
given time and estimate a depreciation function of vessel price as a function of vessel age. 
The gross capital stock (or acquisition price) was estimated by the model, and the net capital 
stock was calculated after the use of a depreciation function. This estimated net capital stock 
value can be different from the market value of the vessel, which encompasses the implicit 
value of intangible assets, specifically fishing rights in the French context where explicitly 
tradable individual access rights do not exist (Guyader, berthou, and daurès 2007). 
  Although different methodologies were used in the different studies reviewed above, 
results point to the fact that when analysing investment in access regulated fisheries, we 
must take into account the various fishing rights that apply, in addition to physical as-
sets, such as vessels and fishing gear. Consequently, we must also take into account the 
possible effects on immaterial capital when evaluating regulations and policies aimed at 
limiting the use of physical capital.
  table 2 gives an overview of the estimations carried out in selected studies, presented 
above, that are based on a modelling approach. Note that Squires, Alauddin, and Kirkley 
1 Quasi-rent is a short-term concept and represents the return earned on a sunk-cost investment in excess of 
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(1994) use a linear programming approach, so the estimated quota price equation is just 
part of their investment analysis. however, the information on the data used in the study 
applies to the full analysis, not just the estimation of a quota price function. table 2 shows 
that only two studies make use of panel data methods when estimating their models 
(Flaaten, Heen, and Salvanes 1995; Nøstbakken 2011). Given that investment decisions 
are dynamic in nature, as they determine flows that affect capital stock variables and they 
are made at the firm or vessel owner level, it is surprising that not more empirical work is 
done using panel models of investment.
  Looking at explanatory variables included in the studies listed in table 2, we find 
that only two include input or output prices (Nøstbakken 2011; Squires, Alauddin, and 
Kirkley 1994). However, Nøstbakken (2011) constructs her input prices based on data 
on input use and production levels. All but one study include measures of one or more 
capital stocks (fish stock, physical capital, quota capital). However, as measures of physi-
cal capital brandt (2007) uses vessel length, Jensen (1998) uses the insurance value of 
fishing vessels, while Nøstbakken (2011) uses the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries’ 
estimates of the capital value of vessels, which are based on the replacement costs of the 
different components of the vessel. If we look at input prices, only two studies use these 
in estimations (Nøstbakken 2011; Squires, Alauddin, and Kirkley 1994). In general, it ap-
pears that the economic variables typically used in the theoretical models of investment 
(be these under assumptions of sole ownership or multiple firms) are not available for 
many fisheries. Hence, it is not straightforward to estimate the relationships proposed by 
the theoretical literature.
Table 2
Estimation of Investment Relationships: Government Policies
Study                               topic        Aggregation       Obs.           Estimator    dependent Variable
Brandt (2007)  Efficiency gain  Vessel  1,248 vessel-  Logit  Harvest
  from ItQs    year obs. 
Flaaten, heen,   Limited entry &  Vessel  48 vessels,   OLS &  1) Gross revenue
& Salvanes (1995)  resource rents     2 years    random  2) Operating costs
          effects
Jensen (1998)  Investment  Vessel  28 years    OLS  Vessel investments
  drivers 
Nøstbakken (2011)  Investment  Owners  195 owner-  Random  1) Physical capital  
  drivers ITQ    year obs.    effects, fixed  inv.
          effects  2) Quota inv.
Squires, Alauddin,  Efficiency gain  Vessel  139 vessels  Tobit  Quota price
& Kirkley (1994)  from ITQs 
The Role of Behavioural Drivers in Observed Investment Strategies
Another strand of research has focused on the role of behavioural drivers in observed 
investment strategies. Traditionally, the solution to overexploitation and overcapitaliza-
tion in fisheries proposed by economic theory has been to assign property rights to the 
resource in order to optimise management. there are, however, studies that suggest that 
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the resource. Moxnes (1998) investigates whether the agents in the fisheries sector have 
the correct perception of the bioeconomics of their resource. his results suggest that there 
are tendencies to overinvest in capacity because individuals apply an investment rule that 
is rational for a flow resource but not optimal for stock resources, such as fisheries.
  Moxnes used an experimental approach to the problem where the subjects were 
asked to manage a fictitious fishing firm over a 20-year period. Three different groups of 
subjects were involved in the experiments: fishermen, bureaucrats, and researchers. The 
fish stock was said to be cod in an isolated fjord, and the subject has exclusive property 
rights of the stock. For every year, decisions had to be made to order new vessels and 
on the utilisation of existing vessels. Information on the economics of the fishing firm, 
catches, fish weight, and biomass estimates was available to the subject.
  Important results from the experiment include the fact that the average fleet size 
controlled by subjects was 60% larger than economically optimal. Furthermore, most 
over-investments are conducted during the first year of management, indicating an “erro-
neous initial analysis” (Moxnes 1998). Lay up of vessels (reduced utilisation) is typically 
used when the adverse effects of overinvestment are revealed, and this is used relatively 
more in later periods. Additionally, capacity utilisation is strongly correlated with invest-
ment behaviour; the aggressive investors also utilise the fleet more aggressively.
  the tendency to overinvest found by Moxnes (1998) can be explained by an informa-
tion problem. Even though subjects are introduced to all relevant information, they might 
not fully perceive all relevant information and will consequently not act optimally due to 
the immediate complexity of the problem.
  In addition to the general tendency to overinvest identified by Moxnes (1998), Chris-
tensen and Raakjær (2006) argue that fishing tactics and strategic decisions vary across 
fishermen. Using interviews and questionnaires they attempt to shed light on short- and 
longer-term decisions by analysing a cross-section of Danish commercial demersal fish-
ermen. An example of short-term decisions is choice of fishing tactics, such as choosing 
fishing location and what gear to use, whereas longer-term decisions can be related to 
investment. One of the main findings regarding investment behaviour is that the age of 
the fishermen influences the level and type of investment. Younger fishermen invest more 
than fishermen approaching retirement, who typically only maintain their vessel(s). Chris-
tensen and Raakjær (2006) define three main types of fishermen. The first owns a small 
fishing vessel and often has no debt. Another is similar in the sense that (s)he is a careful 
investor, but differs in that (s)he operates a bigger vessel. The final group consists of fish-
ermen characterised as dynamic investors making large investments typically in trawlers. 
However, it should be noted that the identification of types of fishermen depends on the 
fishery in question. 
  Another possibly important determinant of investment behaviour is the organisational 
structure of fishing firms. First, fisheries characterised by small owner-operated units may 
not respond to certain incentives in the same way as fishing firms that own large fishing 
vessels that require a large crew, since both the objective function and the possibilities 
of an owner-operator in a small-scale fishery may differ significantly from the objective 
function of a large fishing corporation. Hence, the organisation and scale of the fishery 
may affect investment behaviour. This is supported by the results of Nøstbakken (2011), 
who finds that family firms invest significantly more in the Norwegian purse seine indus-
try than other firms. See also Brandt (2007), discussed above. Second, the possibility of 
vertical integration may have important implications for investment behaviour. Economic 
studies of fisheries typically assume that the harvesting sector is independent of the pro-
cessing sector. however, if there is vertical integration, the investment problem changes. 
Several studies, including Clark and Munro (1980), have analysed implications of vertical 
integration for fisheries management policy, but little work has been done to analyse the 
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Perspectives for Future Work
Our review of the theoretical fisheries economic literature shows that only some of the 
many aspects of investment and capital adjustment have been investigated. In this sec-
tion, we provide some conclusions and propose topics for future research.
 
Theoretical Models of Optimal Investment in Different Types of Capital
Many studies, particularly theoretical studies, focus exclusively on investment in physi-
cal capital or in some aggregate measure of capital. As shown by hannesson (1996) and 
Flaaten, heen, and Salvanes (1995), it is important to distinguish between investment in 
physical capital and immaterial capital, such as transferable quotas or fishing licenses. 
There are, however, few studies of the different components of capital in marine fisheries 
and notably of investment in human capital and immaterial assets (fishing rights) where 
these exist. human capital is rarely, if ever, mentioned in studies of investment, although 
as stressed by Munro (2010), it may pose issues similar to those encountered with invest-
ment in physical capital, particularly regarding its limited malleability. Furthermore, 
whereas there is a strong interest in ItQs and access-regulation instruments among 
economists, there is still limited empirical analysis of the relation between the operation 
of these schemes and the existence and evolution of investment strategies in immaterial 
capital. Overall, little work has been done on how fishing firms jointly determine their 
investment in physical, human, and immaterial capital on the policy effects of this and 
other related issues. 
  Extending the existing theoretical modelling framework to account for different types 
of capital represents an important avenue for future research. A first step involves exam-
ining the optimal level of physical, immaterial, and human capital from a social planner 
perspective, both at the aggregate and disaggregate levels. next, there is a need to identify 
the optimal investment policy in this situation at the fishing firm level. This will depend 
on the regulatory framework. For example, if a firm operates in an ITQ regulated fishery, 
we must ask how much it should invest in physical capital, human capital, and quotas. 
Finally, theoretical work is needed to identify policy instruments and policy design that 
induces firms to act according to the objectives of the social planner.
Implications of Uncertainty on Investment Behaviour
Another issue that strikes us is that few studies focus on the implications of uncertainty 
on investment, capital, and capacity. this could be because of the complexity of the prob-
lem at hand even without stochastic elements in the models. nonetheless, in an industry 
with natural variability playing such an important role as in fisheries, uncertainty may 
potentially have a great impact on the investment decisions of the fishing firms and, con-
sequently, the capacity development of the fleet as a whole. 
  With the rapid increase in computational power and improvements in available nu-
merical methods, there is great scope for increasing the knowledge of how uncertainty 
affects investment and capital adjustment in fisheries by use of numerical modelling. This 
is also an interesting topic for future empirical research. How does variability in stock-
growth, output prices, quota prices, etc., affect a firm’s investment in different types of 
capital? What can the regulator do to alleviate potential negative impacts of uncertainty 
on firms? What are the implications of uncertainty for policy regarding management of 
fisheries and choice of policy instruments?Nøstbakken, Thébaud, and Sørensen 112
Econometric Studies of Investment
Capital is closely related to fishing capacity; hence, changes in capacity also relate close-
ly to changes in capital. but whereas there is a large empirical literature on measuring 
capacity and capacity utilisation in fisheries, far less work has been done on investment 
and drivers of investment in fisheries. Furthermore, the work that has been done has been 
predominantly theoretical.
  Overall, less research has been done in which economic models of investment and 
capacity development have been empirically specified and estimated. One likely reason is 
the lack of detailed data on investment and other economic variables (Kirkley and Squires 
1988). A common problem when using econometric methods to analyse investment be-
haviour is limited data availability. If the time series are not very long and the number 
of observations not very large, it is quite possible that standard econometric methods for 
analysing investment behaviour will not work well. Furthermore, complete econometric 
specifications of investment models typically require data on many variables with a rela-
tively high level of detail. this also explains the popularity of data envelopment analysis 
(dEA) and other similar approaches in studies of capacity and capacity utilisation, as these 
methods are far less data intensive than many econometric methods. Several comprehen-
sive reviews of the literature on capacity and capacity utilisation already exist, and we 
have not examined this part of the literature in our survey (see the review by Pascoe 2007). 
  The lack of reliable economic data combined with the considerable attention devoted 
to fishing capacity and its management call for setting up data collection procedures that 
ensure that time series suitable for comprehensive econometric analysis of investment 
behaviour become available. In addition, research should be devoted to developing bet-
ter methods for valuating both physical and immaterial capital stocks based on available 
data. Finally, there is great potential for econometric analysis of firm-level investment 
behaviour. this involves identifying investment drivers and how such drivers are affected 
by the regulatory framework and other factors. One possibility is to develop and estimate 
structural models based on the theoretical framework discussed earlier. Eventually, the 
investment models developed could be integrated in coupled bio-economic simulation 
models to improve the ability of decision support tools to predict the medium- to long-
term responses of fisheries to management strategies.
Fishery Organisation and Investment Behaviour
There has been little work, both theoretical and empirical, on how the organisation of 
the fishery (scale, vertical integration, type of owners) affects investment and capacity 
development. When analysing investment behaviour, it is important to identify the appro-
priate decision making unit. It is crucial to analyse investment and capacity adjustment 
decisions at the level where such decisions in fact take place. Traditionally, empirical 
analyses of investment and capacity adjustment in fisheries have been conducted at the 
vessel level. This is likely a result of how data have typically been collected, namely fo-
cusing on vessels. In many fisheries, it is not unusual that several vessels are controlled 
and operated by the same firm or owners. Hence, the appropriate level of analysis could 
be at the firm or owner level, not at the vessel level. In some artisanal fisheries, fishing 
may be carried out by households as part of a broader set of revenue-generating activities, 
and investment in the fishing component of the household business may be dependent on 
non-fishing related factors, such that the household may be the relevant decision unit to 
consider. In vertically integrated fishing firms, which include a catching and a process-
ing activity, the drivers of investment in the catching activity may also be influenced by 
factors that relate to processing, and the firm level, including processing, may be the rel-
evant decision unit. Hence, in a large number of cases, analysis of investment in fishing Investment Behaviour and Capacity Adjustment in Fisheries 113
will need to be carried out at levels other than the vessel. this will also allow for easier 
identification of trade in second-hand vessels and fishing rights, which may account for a 
significant share of the overall investment decisions undertaken in a fishery. However, the 
appropriate specification depends on the characteristics of the fishery, and analysis at the 
vessel level may, in many cases, give an accurate representation.
  Research questions related to this topic include: how do different types of owners 
invest? Do large firms differ from small firms? Do family firms invest differently from 
other firms? How does vertical integration affect investment and capital adjustment? Can 
the efficiency of the fishery be increased if we impose restrictions on who can own fish-
ing firms or operate in the fishery? Both theoretical and empirical research is required to 
answer these and related questions.
The Impacts of Public Policies on Investment 
the number of studies focusing on the impacts of public policies on investment strategies 
appears relatively limited, although such policies may have significant consequences, par-
ticularly when they relate to fishery access regulation. Furthermore, in many commercial 
fisheries, access rights, licences, quotas, and other instruments introduced through regula-
tions have become objects of investment. Hence, the fishing firms’ investment decision 
comprises investment in these capital assets in addition to physical capital. 
  Research on the relationship between public policies and investment is related to all 
of the previously mentioned research topics, since basically every fishery is regulated in 
one way or another. Given the importance of public policies, we present the topic under 
a separate heading. Both theoretical and empirical work is needed to better understand 
how investment behaviour is affected by policy and specific regulatory instruments. This 
involves the investment in physical capital as well as other types of capital. We have 
identified a particular need for more empirical work on this topic. What drives firm-level 
investment in physical capital and fishing rights in ITQ or access regulated fisheries? 
Does the introduction of ITQs in a fishery lead to reduced excess capacity and increased 
efficiency as predicted by theoretical models? 
  Another highly relevant issue is non-compliance and illegal fishing, which depends 
on the regulator’s ability to enforce fishery regulations and quotas. A firm that has the 
possibility to exceed quotas and harvest fish illegally may have incentives to invest more 
in physical capital than a compliant firm. The possibility to fish illegally is likely to also 
affect the demand for immaterial and human capital. Little work has been done on the 
relationship between non-compliance and firm-level investment behaviour. Hence, this 
represents a promising and relevant topic for future research. 
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